A rboviruses are a potential threat to blood transfusion safety. Globally, arboviral transfusion-transmission (TT) has been reported for dengue viruses (DENV) 1, 2 and West Nile virus (WNV). 3 In Australia, outbreaks of Ross River virus (RRV) and DENV threaten blood supply safety, and transfusion-transmitted RRV has been reported. 4 Most recently, Zika virus (ZIKV) has been shown to have potential for TT. Transmission of ZIKV through platelet transfusion has been reported in Brazil, 5, 6 and a number of countries have detected ZIKV-positive blood donations. [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ZIKV is primarily transmitted to humans through the bite of an infected female Aedes aegypti or Aedes albopictus mosquito, which are both also principal vectors of DENV and chikungunya virus. Nonvector transmission of ZIKV is also possible through sexual contact, 13 perinatally, 14, 15 and via blood transfusion. 5, 6 ZIKV infection is asymptomatic in up to 80% of cases [50%-80%], 16, 17 and symptomatic infection is usually mild, self-limiting, and nonspecific, with low-grade fever, arthralgia, myalgia, headache, and conjunctivitis. 18 ZIKV is a cause of Guillain-Barré syndrome 19 and, when acquired during pregnancy, can cause miscarriage or neurological birth defects. 20 As there is currently no vaccine or specific treatment, the principal methods to prevent disease spread are control of mosquito populations, and human behavioral adaptation, such as the use of mosquito repellents and avoiding unprotected sexual contact with infected individuals. Local transmission of ZIKV has not hitherto been reported in Australia. However, the necessary conditions for local transmission exist, and, owing to the high rate of asymptomatic infection, cryptic transmission is theoretically plausible and cannot be discounted. The primary vector, Ae. aegypti, is endemic in north-eastern Australia, where it periodically sustains outbreaks of DENV. [21] [22] [23] Aedes albopictus is present in the Torres Strait but not on mainland Australia. 24 Australian populations of both vectors can transmit ZIKV in the laboratory. 25, 26 Given a high predicted risk of geographic range expansion of both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus, the potential for local outbreaks of ZIKV may also extend to other regions of Australia. 24, 27 More than 133 cases of confirmed or probable ZIKV infection have been reported in travelers to Australia since 2012, 28 with the highest number of notifications reported in Queensland where Ae. aegypti is present. 29 The potential for local transmission in these regions during [2015] [2016] has been demonstrated using vectorial capacity modeling. 30 The Australian Red Cross Blood Service (Blood Service) has several risk minimization strategies to ensure the risk of ZIKV TT is minimal. 31 Donors are either deferred or prevented from donating blood destined for fresh-component manufacture if they have returned from countries endemic for ZIKV (4 weeks), have had a diagnosed ZIKV infection (4 months), or have had sexual contact with an infected person (4 weeks). 31 However, an outbreak of ZIKV in Australia has the potential to evade standard donor deferrals and thus impact blood safety and availability, particularly given the relatively high rate of asymptomatic infection and previous documentation of TT from presymptomatic donors. 6 The United States (USA), among other countries, has implemented additional blood safety measures, including mandatory individual or pooled donation screening using nucleic acid testing (NAT) and/or pathogen inactivation for plasma and platelet donations. 32 Integral to the estimation of ZIKV outbreak risk and public health preparedness effort is an understanding of the transmission dynamics that drive the establishment of this virus in a population. Previous studies have used mathematical modeling of the basic reproduction number (R 0 ) to examine the transmission dynamics of ZIKV epidemics in Micronesia (2007), 33 French Polynesia (2013-2014), 16 Brazil (2015-2016), 34 Columbia (2015-2016), 35, 36 Singapore (2016), 36 and the USA (2016), 37 and outbreaks of DENV in Australia. 38 The present study applied a published model of R 0 to nominated locations in Australia, assuming the introduction of a viremic individual and the presence of an Ae. aegypti population, with the aim of providing an estimate of the risk of vector-borne ZIKV transmission in each location. We used the ecologically similar DENV to validate our model and as a point of comparison for ZIKV in the context of a transfusiontransmitted arbovirus that already periodically occurs in parts of Australia. This information may assist health authorities and the Blood Service in risk assessment and risk-mitigation planning and inform better management of arboviral threats to population health and blood safety in the future.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

Study area and period
Eleven Urban Centres and Localities (UCLs) in Australia were selected for modeling: Cairns, Rockhampton, Thursday Island (Torres Strait), and Townsville, which have established Ae. aegypti populations; Brisbane, Darwin, Perth, and Sydney, which previously had established Ae. aegypti populations that have now disappeared; and Adelaide, Hobart, and Melbourne, which have never recorded established Ae. aegypti populations. 22, 23, 27 Estimates were made monthly over a 20-year period from January 1996 to December 2015 at each location.
Estimation of ZIKV and DENV epidemic potential
R 0 is used to estimate the epidemic potential of a vectorpathogen combination. 34 It is defined as the number of secondary infections produced per day from a single primary infection introduced into an immunologically naive population. An R 0 of 1 is the threshold of epidemic potential, with an R 0 > 1 indicating that a pathogen will spread and persist in a population. R 0 can be calculated empirically using notified cases from a known epidemic or theoretically by assuming the introduction of a single infective case and, in the case of an arbovirus, modeling transmission based on entomological, viral, and human population parameters. Given there has been no reported local transmission of ZIKV in Australia, a theoretical model was adapted from Villela et al. 34 to estimate R 0 for ZIKV and DENV:
All parameter descriptions are summarized in Table 1 . The addition of the vector control rate (c) to the model represents the active measures undertaken by vector control agencies to reduce the mosquito population. Modeling was performed using the free software R 57 (version 3.4.1). R 0 modeling assumes the introduction of viremic infections into an immunologically naive population. 34 We made the following additional assumptions: 1) an Ae. aegypti population is present in each UCL and is the only vector; 2) the mosquito population is modeled accurately by the container-inhabiting mosquito simulation (CIMSiM) modeling program; 3) the human population undergoes linear growth throughout the study period and ignores births and deaths; 4) transmission of ZIKV occurred through the mosquito vector only, and sexual transmission is ignored; 5) vector control is present and consistent between UCLs.
Data sources
The average temperature for each month from January 1996 to December 2015 was calculated from the mean maximum and minimum temperatures obtained from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. 58 The density of Ae. aegypti hostseeking females was obtained from the model CIMSiM, which is driven by daily meteorological observations. 59 The CIMSiM modeling program has been previously validated for its ability to simulate Ae. aegypti productivity in Australia. 60 The density of human population was obtained 
Scenarios considered
Modeling was performed using combinations of upper and lower bounds of the vector control rate (c) and duration of the extrinsic incubation period (EIP; τ; Table 1 ) to represent the spectrum of possibilities for the epidemic potential of ZIKV and DENV. The hypothetical "best-case" and "worst-case" scenarios were examined by using the combinations of upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval (CI) around (c) and (τ). Although we could not quantify the sensitivity in R 0,ZIKV and R 0,DENV models, we accounted for the uncertainty of two biological parameters, considering three different scenarios (best-case, intermediate-case, and worst-case scenarios). These scenarios represented the likelihood of local mosquito-borne transmission based on different estimates of vector control efficiency and EIP. The worst-case scenario assumed a short EIP (low τ) and low efficiency of the vector control (high c) and represented the case of high potential for uncontrolled outbreak potential, whereas the best-case scenario used a high τ and a low c, representing low potential for an explosive and uncontrolled outbreak. An intermediate-case scenario was included to highlight the effect of altering either vector control or EIP independently (low τ and low c).
Model validation
Unlike ZIKV, local transmission of DENV frequently occurs in Cairns and has caused notable outbreaks in 2003, 2008-2009, and 2012-2013 . 21 This allowed an additional estimation of R 0 based on notification data during the outbreak, according to the formula from Pinho et al. 54 (parameters described in Table 1 ).
Vazquez et al. 61 have also published estimates of R 0 during these outbreaks. We used these estimates of R 0 to compare with our R 0,DENV estimates to validate our model.
Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
To quantify the impact of each parameter's variation on the outcome variable in the R 0 model (Equation 3), we combined uncertainty analysis through the Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) with the sensitivity analysis through robust partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) method. 36, 62, 63 We used the LHS method to generate 100,000 samples uniformly distributed in the range of parameter values (Table 1) and calculated the corresponding uncertainty on R 0 (Equation 3 ). An LHS matrix was generated with 100,000 rows for the number of simulations and eight columns corresponding to the number of varied parameters (Λ, τ d , μ T , c, θ h , μ h , α h, AvgT) involved in R 0 calculation. Finally, to identify the key factors that determine the magnitude of this basic reproduction number, we computed the PRCCs between each parameter and R 0 .
Mapping
To visualize whether blood donors resided in areas at-risk of ZIKV outbreak, values for R 0 at each UCL and average annual blood donor numbers (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) at the SA3 level were mapped using ArcGIS 10.4 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA).
RESULTS
Parameter uncertainty and model validation
To account for the uncertainty of two biological parameters (c and τ), we considered three different scenarios (best-case, intermediate-case, and worst-case scenarios). We tested and validated our temperature-driven reproduction number models by comparing our best-case and worst-case scenario estimates of R 0,DENV for the Cairns DENV outbreaks of 2003 and 2008-2009 to two published models based on notification data from the outbreaks ( 
64-66
Basic reproduction number estimates
Applying our model to ZIKV, estimates for R 0,ZIKV were calculated monthly from January 1996 to December 2015 in each of the 11 UCLs (Fig. 1) . For each scenario, epidemic potential (R 0 > 1) for ZIKV was found in six of the 11 locations (Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Rockhampton, Thursday Island, Townsville). There was no epidemic potential in the remaining five locations (Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth, Sydney), which all shared an R 0 ≈ 0 throughout the year. R 0 for ZIKV was greatest during the warmer months, peaking in either February (Brisbane, Cairns, Rockhampton) or March (Darwin, Thursday Island, Townsville) and falling during the cooler months (Fig. 1) . Of the six locations where R 0 > 1 was found, there was a mean R 0 > 1 year-round in the worst-case scenario for Darwin, Thursday Island, and Cairns. However, this dropped below the threshold of epidemic potential in the best-case and intermediate scenarios from June to October (Darwin), July to November (Thursday Island), and July to August (Cairns). In comparison, mean R 0 for Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsville dropped below the epidemic threshold from May to October even under the worst-case scenario.
The mean R 0 for the warmer six months (November to April) under the worst-case and best-case scenarios provide Figure 1 . Legend on next page. a single estimate for each modeled location and allowed comparison between ZIKV and DENV (Table 3 ). This also gave a higher overall estimate than if all months were included. However, it is noted that for Brisbane and Townsville, the yearly mean R 0 would have fallen under 1 if estimates from cooler months had been included. Therefore, the six-month mean R 0 was also estimated to avoid giving a false impression that epidemic potential did not exist at all in Brisbane (1.11, 95% CI: 0.89-1.34) and Townsville (1.19, 95% CI: 0.96-1.42). Cairns had the highest overall R 0 for ZIKV and DENV and therefore the greatest risk of an outbreak, followed by Darwin and Rockhampton. When compared with mean R 0,DENV estimates for the same scenario and location, values for R 0,ZIKV were consistently lower in the six locations with epidemic potential from November to April. Neither ZIKV nor DENV demonstrated epidemic potential in the cities of Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth, or Sydney, with an average R 0 ≈ 0.
Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
We plotted the median and 95% CI of R 0 (2.683, 95% CI: 2.681-2.685) for DENV using Equation 3 ( Supplementary  Fig. 1a ). Sensitivity analyses showed that the rate of humans recovering from infection had a significant and greatest negative impact on R 0 outcomes ( Supplementary Fig. 1b) . The other parameters did not have significant impacts on R 0 outcomes.
Efficiency of vector control
Altering the estimated efficiency of vector control in our modeling had a much greater effect on both the strength and the seasonal duration of epidemic potential than altering the EIP. For example, the six-month mean R 0,ZIKV in Darwin was reduced from 3.05 in the worst-case scenario to 1.76 (42.2% reduction) in the intermediate scenario when the vector control rate was raised from 70% to 90% eradication (Table 3) . This translates to a reduction from year-round epidemic potential to a seasonal epidemic potential from November to May (Fig. 1) . Conversely the same value was obtained from the best-case scenario (mean R 0 = 1.70) by assuming a shorter EIP for ZIKV (7 vs 10 days). However, this resulted in only a 3.5% strengthening of epidemic potential and no change in seasonal duration (Table 3 ; Fig. 1 ).
Implications for blood safety
The mean R 0,ZIKV of the warmer six months of the year (November to April) for each location under the worst-case R 0 : basic reproduction number for mosquito-borne transmission; *R 0 estimates < 0.001 were entered as 0.00. ZIKV = Zika virus; CI = Confidence interval; UCL = Urban Centre and Locality; τ = extrinsic incubation period (see Table 1 ); c = vector control rate (see Table 1 ). UCL: Urban Centre and Locality; τ: extrinsic incubation period (see Table 1 ); c: vector control rate (see Table 1 ). *R 0 estimates for Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth, and Sydney were not displayed because all values were less than 0.001 throughout the year.
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and best-case scenarios were mapped along with the geographical distribution of the mean yearly number of blood donors to visualize any overlap with areas "at risk" of a ZIKV outbreak (Fig. 2) . Blood donors were concentrated in the highly populated areas of Victoria and New South Wales (including the cities of Melbourne and Sydney), where there was no epidemic potential for ZIKV. Only 17.24% of blood donors resided in areas with epidemic potential for ZIKV, with the greatest average number from Brisbane (n = 157,715), followed by Townsville (n = 21,746), Rockhampton (n = 6,754), Cairns (n = 9,028), then Darwin (n = 4,892). There were no recorded donors from Thursday Island. The annual mean number of blood donors in areas where local transmission of ZIKV was currently possible (Cairns, Rockhampton, and Townsville) represented only 3.2% of Australian donors.
DISCUSSION
An outbreak of ZIKV in Australia would have implications for public health, tourism, and blood transfusion safety.
Given the risk for local ZIKV transmission in Australia, we used a published model of R 0 to predict the epidemic potential of ZIKV. Our study is the first to estimate R 0 for ZIKV in Australia and builds on the vectorial capacity modeling of Viennet et al., 30 which demonstrated local transmission potential for ZIKV in Cairns, Townsville, Rockhampton, and Brisbane during the warmer months of 2015-2016. One of the utilities of our R 0 model over the vectorial capacity model is the use of the relative population density of mosquitoes to humans, making our estimates of epidemic potential more location specific. We found potential for local ZIKV transmission in the UCLs of Cairns, Darwin, Rockhampton, Thursday Island, Townsville, and Brisbane during the warmer half of the year, with peak potential in February or March. Despite a decline in global circulation of ZIKV in 2017, these findings indicate a risk of an outbreak in Cairns, Rockhampton, Thursday Island, and Townsville, all which have established Ae. aegypti populations, should an infective case be imported. Conversely, the risk of an outbreak remains theoretical in Brisbane and Darwin due to the absence of Ae. aegypti populations. Table 1 ); c: vector control rate (see Table 1 ).
However, these locations have sustained populations of Ae. aegypti mosquitoes in the past and face the threat of range expansion with changing urban landscape features and human behaviors. 22, 23 Indeed, Ae. aegypti are regularly intercepted at international first points of entry across Australia, further highlighting potential risk of establishment of these vectors.
In the absence of reported autochthonous ZIKV cases in Australia, our estimates of epidemic potential support the hypothesis that undetected local ZIKV transmission could theoretically have occurred in Australia but was not reported, possibly due to asymptomatic infection. Nevertheless, if local transmission has truly not occurred, this is likely due to the low numbers of imported cases of ZIKV, combined with existing mosquito management efforts in vulnerable locations visited by the case and therefore a low chance of interaction between the imported case and Ae. aegypti mosquitoes. 29 Absence of local transmission may also be influenced by virus/mosquito factors such as variation in vector competence or virus virulence, and protective human behaviors such as use of repellents or use of window screens and air conditioning to preclude mosquitoes. Our modeling considered local populations of Ae. aegypti to have an infection rate of 57% and transmission rate of 27%. 25 However, a recent study by Duchemin et al., 26 found a higher rate of ZIKV infection (83%) and transmission (87%), suggesting that the true epidemic potential may be higher than predicted here. Epidemic potential for ZIKV in Australian UCLs, combined with the capacity for presymptomatic and asymptomatic viremia, indicates a possible risk to the blood supply during periods of local transmission. However, the majority of blood donors resided in and around the large metropolitan centers of Sydney and Melbourne, which did not have epidemic potential for ZIKV. Geographical separation of cases and locations of blood donors may also be a key determinant in the low risk of TT of RRV 67 and DENV 65 in
Australia. Local transmission of ZIKV where an outbreak is currently possible (Cairns, Rockhampton, or Townsville) presents the highest risk, although these locations combined represent only a small proportion of blood donors. A policy restricting donations during local outbreaks to plasma for fractionation only, as undertaken during DENV outbreaks, 64 would likely be sufficient to protect blood safety in these locations. 29 However, this policy could place a considerable strain on supply in areas with larger numbers of donations and a higher theoretical outbreak risk. With the likely range expansion of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus in the future, it is essential that there is continued investment in alternative risk-mitigation strategies to protect the blood supply. Alternative strategies that could be implemented in identified highrisk areas and times include pathogen inactivation, which is effective in eliminating ZIKV in both platelet and plasma components, 68, 69 and blood donation screening for ZIKV, 70 although neither is currently regulated for use in Australia, and these strategies have not been cost-effective in the USA. 11 The utility of R 0 estimates such as ours going forward will be in informing the government and the Blood Service of the most at-risk locations and months for local ZIKV and DENV transmission for the purposes of risk stratification and timely introduction of the aforementioned preemptive riskmitigation strategies. With further refinement of the model, an R 0 threshold could ultimately be used to indicate an unacceptably high level of outbreak risk in a particular location/ time and trigger a temporary donation restriction, screening, or inactivation program. Unlike published estimates, our modeling of R 0 is not derived from case notifications, as Australia has not experienced local ZIKV transmission. However, a benefit of not using notification data is that misdiagnosis and underreporting issues that are common during ZIKV epidemics, because of the nonspecific clinical presentation, 71 do not affect our model. Nonetheless, our six-month estimates of R 0 for ZIKV in Cairns are broadly consistent with locations that have sustained ZIKV outbreaks, such as Brazil (2.33), 34 French Polynesia (2.6-4.8), 16 Colombia (3.8), 35 and Micronesia (4.3-5.8).
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Our study incorporated a vector control parameter to highlight the importance of mosquito surveillance and control measures. The aim of vector control is to break the transmission cycle by quickly killing infective mosquitoes and removing their oviposition sites through different activities, such as interior residual spray, lethal ovitrap deployment, barrier spray, and larval source reduction. 72 An increase in vector control efficiency markedly reduced the strength of epidemic potential and shortened the season of local transmission. This has important implications in mitigating risk in areas with a current possibility of an outbreak (Cairns, Rockhampton, Thursday Island, Townsville). Comparing ZIKV to DENV using our model, we found the latter to have consistently greater epidemic potential in locations that sustained local transmission, but this trend was not sufficient to suggest locations that could support DENV transmission but not ZIKV. The lower estimate of R 0 for ZIKV than for DENV in our modeling is attributed to a much lower estimate of vector-to-human transmission probability through each bite. A higher estimate of ZIKV vector competence may reduce the observed differences in epidemic potential between ZIKV and DENV. In the absence of a licensed vaccine for either ZIKV or DENV, immunity is conferred through previous infection. While the seroprevalence of ZIKV IgG in Australia is unknown, it is very likely < 1% given the paucity of reported cases, whereas the seroprevalence of DENV IgG is around 10% in blood donors in northern Queensland, suggesting immunity to at least one serotype. 64 Low levels of population immunity to ZIKV were thought to have contributed to the large magnitude of the French Polynesia outbreak in 2013-2014, 73 and could be replicated in Australia. 29, 64, 65, [67] [68] [69] [70] Given that we cannot use notification data to drive our model, our estimates are vulnerable to parameter uncertainty.
In particular, there is no consensus on the length of the infectious period for ZIKV in humans, and many of our other virus-specific parameters rely on a single vector-competence study of local Aedes mosquitoes. 25 Due to this uncertainty we did not proceed with sensitivity analysis for either Equation 1 or Equation 2. Further, temperature-dependent parameters used may not have been applicable in some UCLs with mean temperatures outside the 21 C to 32 C assumed range, with the impact of temperature on ZIKV replication in mosquitoes not fully described. Future research in the foregoing areas will constrain these parameters to model more precise predictions of epidemic potential. A few additional features warrant consideration when comparing overall risk. First is the contribution of sexual transmission to epidemic potential in ZIKV but not DENV. While not considered in our model, sexual transmission is thought to increase the size of a ZIKV epidemic, although it may not itself initiate or sustain a large outbreak. 36 Secondly, we did not model the contribution of Ae. albopictus on Thursday Island, which would likely have raised the estimates of epidemic potential. Finally, we simplified the infectious period of ZIKV to a single parameter based on a median 14 days from symptom onset till loss of viral RNA in the serum. 41 Overall our modeling provides an important early step toward understanding the epidemic potential of local ZIKV transmission in Australia. Our findings highlight the importance of ongoing vector surveillance and control programs to reduce the population of Aedes mosquitoes in areas already affected and at risk of an outbreak, and to prevent their spread into new areas, especially those with theoretical epidemic potential (Brisbane, Darwin). While the risk to transfusion safety is currently negligible, an outbreak of ZIKV has the potential to threaten blood supply safety in some areas, and quantification of this risk would be warranted should local transmission occur.
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